

Unit 9

THE CONSOLIDATION OF LARGE NATION-STATES
1859 - 1871

Section A: Backgrounds: The Idea of the Nation-State

<u>Reading</u>	Palmer and Colton: 517 - 521 Nationalism: Myth and Reality- Shafer
<u>Key Topics</u>	The Idea of the Nation-State The Crimean War, 1854 - 1856
<u>IDs</u>	Crimean War and Florence Nightingale

Section B: Cavour and the Italian War of 1859: The Unification of Italy

<u>Reading</u>	Palmer and Colton: 521 - 525
<u>Key Topics</u>	Italian Nationalism: The Program of Cavour The Completion of Italian Unity Persistent Problems after Unification
<u>IDs</u>	the Risorgimento King Victor Emmanuel Camilli di Cavour Giuseppe Garibaldi <i>Italia Irredenta</i> the "occupation of Rome"

Section C: Bismarck: The Founding of a German Empire

<u>Reading</u>	Palmer and Colton: 525 - 534 Speeches on Pragmatism and State Socialism- Bismarck
<u>Key Topics</u>	The German States after 1848 Prussia in the 1860s: Bismarck Bismarck's Wars: The North German Confederation, 1867 The Franco-Prussian War The German Empire, 1871
<u>IDs</u>	Zolleverein Otto von Bismarck "blood and iron" Schleswig and Holstein The Seven Weeks War North German Confederation Franco- Prussian War "Ems dispatch"

Section D: The Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary

<u>Reading</u>	Palmer and Colton: 534 - 536
<u>Key Topics</u>	The Hapsburg Empire after 1848 The Compromise of 1867
<u>IDs</u>	the compromise of 1867- the <i>Ausgleich</i>

Section E: Liberalization in Tsarist Russia: Alexander II

<u>Reading</u>	Palmer and Colton: 537 - 544
<u>Key Topics</u>	Tsarist Russia after 1856 The Emancipation Act of 1861 and Other Reforms Revolutionism in Russia
<u>IDs</u>	Alexander II the Emancipation Act of 1861 intelligentsia and revolutionaries Alexander Herzen Michael Bakunin <i>The People's Will</i> Alexander III

Nationalism: Myth and Reality

Boyd Shafer

Although growing nationalism was a general pattern during the nineteenth century, the forms that nationalism took and its actual meaning differed over time and in various areas. Indeed, "nationalism" is a term that historians have usually used quite loosely, adding to problems of understanding its meaning. In the following selection, Boyd Shafer attempts to define nationalism by listing ten characteristics it embodies.

Consider: What it would mean to be a German or Italian "nationalist" during the second half of the nineteenth century, according to Shafer's definition of nationalism; what the political implications are of nationalism so defined; the elements of this definition that make nationalism such a historically powerful force.

1. A certain defined (often vaguely) unit of territory (whether possessed or coveted).
2. Some common cultural characteristics such as language (or widely understood languages), customs, manners, and literature (folk tales and lore are a beginning). If an individual believes he shares these, and wishes to continue sharing them, he is usually said to be a member of the nationality.
3. Some common dominant social (as Christian) and economic (as capitalistic or recently communistic) institutions.
4. A common independent or sovereign government (type does not matter) or the desire for one. The "principle" that each nationality should be separate and independent is involved here.
5. A belief in a common history (it can be invented) and in a common origin (often mistakenly conceived to be racial in nature).
6. A love or esteem for fellow nationals (not necessarily as individuals).
7. A devotion to the entity (however little comprehended) called the nation, which embodies the common territory, culture, social and economic institutions, government, and the fellow nationals, and which is at the same time (whether organism or not) more than their sum.
8. A common pride in the achievements (often the military more than the cultural) of this nation and a common sorrow in its tragedies (particularly its defeats).
9. A disregard for or hostility to other (not necessarily all) like groups, especially if these prevent or seem to threaten the separate national existence.
10. A hope that the nation will have a great and glorious future (usually in territorial expansion) and become supreme in some way (in world power if the nation is already large).

Speeches on Pragmatism and State Socialism

Otto von Bismarck

The revolutions of 1848 were ultimately a blow to idealistic reform. Thereafter, governments pursued more limited goals. They tended to resort to more authoritarian measures, to avoid doctrinaire policies, and even to adopt certain programs of opposing groups in the hopes of weakening determined opposition to the government. Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) did this in Germany. Born into a noble Prussian family, Bismarck rose to the position of chief minister under the king in 1862. The first selection below is from an 1862 speech to the Reichstag, in which he argues that the idealism of 1848 must be replaced by a conservative realism.

Bismarck remained in power until 1890. During this time he and his conservative supporters faced opposition from some liberals and from a growing number of socialists representing the working class. In the 1880s Bismarck supported some of the workers' demands for social insurance and pushed through such legislation as the German Workers' Insurance Laws. The remaining excerpts below Bismarck's speeches indicate the rationale behind these policies.

Consider: What Bismarck means when he says the great questions of the day will be decided by iron and blood; how Bismarck justifies his support of "socialist" policies; why Bismarck would support such policies; what conservatives have to gain and who stands to lose by enactment of these policies.

IRON AND BLOOD

...It is true that we can hardly escape complications in Germany, although we do not seek them. Germany does not look to Prussia's liberalism, but to her power. The south German States—Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden—would like to indulge in liberalism, and because of that no one will assign Prussia's role to them! Prussia must collect her forces and hold them in reserve for an opportune moment, which has already come and gone several times. Since the Treaty of Vienna, our frontiers have not been favorably designed for a healthy body politic. Not by speeches and majorities will the great questions of the day be decided—that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849—but by iron and blood.

STATE SOCIALISM

Herr Richter has called attention to the responsibility of the State for what it does. But it is my opinion that the State can also be responsible for what it does not do. I do not think that doctrines like those of '*Laissez-faire, laissez-aller*,' 'Pure Manchesterdom in politics,' 'He who is not strong enough to stand must be knocked down and trodden to the ground,' 'To him that hath shall be given, and from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath,'—that doctrines like these should be applied in the State, and especially in a monarchically, paternally governed State. On the other hand, I believe that those who profess horror at the intervention of the State for the protection of the weak lay themselves open to the suspicion that they are desirous of using their strength—be it that of capital, that of rhetoric, or whatever it be—for the benefit of a section, for the oppression of the rest, for the introduction of party domination, and that they will be chagrined as soon as this design is disturbed by any action of the Government.

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Give the working-man the right to work as long as he is healthy; assure him care when he is sick; assure him maintenance when he is old. If you do that, and do not fear the sacrifice, or cry out at State Socialism directly the words 'provision for old age' are uttered,—if the State will show a little more Christian solicitude for the working-man, then I be-

lieve that the gentlemen of the Wyden (Social-Democratic) programme will sound their bird-call in vain, and that the thronging to them will cease as soon as working-men see that the Government and legislative bodies are earnestly concerned for their welfare.

Yes, I acknowledge unconditionally a right to work, and I will stand up for it as long as I am in this place. But here I do not stand upon the ground of Socialism, which is said to have only begun with the Bismarck Ministry, but on that of the Prussian common law.

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Many measures which we have adopted to the great blessing of the country are Socialistic, and the State will have to accustom itself to a little more Socialism yet. We must meet our needs in the domain of Socialism by reformatory measures if we would display the wisdom shown in Prussia by the Stein-Hardenberg legislation respecting the emancipation of the peasantry. That was Socialism, to take land from one person and give it to another—a much stronger form of Socialism than a monopoly. But I am glad that this Socialism was adopted, for we have as a consequence secured a free and very well-to-do peasantry, and I hope that we shall in time do something of the sort for the labouring classes. Whether I, however, shall live to see it—with the general opposition which is, as a matter of principle, offered to me on all sides, and which is wearying me—I cannot say. But you will be compelled to put a few drops of social oil into the recipe which you give to the State—how much I do not know.... The establishment of the freedom of the peasantry was Socialistic; Socialistic, too, is every expropriation in favour of railways; Socialistic to the utmost extent is the aggregation of estates—the law exists in many provinces—taking from one and giving to another, simply because this other can cultivate the land more conveniently; Socialistic is expropriation under the Water Legislation, on account of irrigation, etc., where a man's land is taken away from him because another can farm it better; Socialistic is our entire poor relief, compulsory school attendance, compulsory construction of roads, so that I am bound to maintain a road upon my lands for travellers. That is all Socialistic, and I could extend the register further; but if you believe that you can frighten any one or call upon spectators with the word 'Socialism,' you take a standpoint which I abandoned long ago, and the abandonment of which is absolutely necessary for our entire imperial legislation.

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The whole matter centres in the question, Is it the duty of the State, or is it not, to provide for its helpless citizens? I maintain that it is its duty, that it is the duty not only of the 'Christian State,' as I ventured once to call it when speaking of 'practical Christianity,' but of every State. It would be foolish for a corporation to undertake matters which the indi-

vidual can attend to alone; and similarly the purposes which the parish can fulfil with justice and with advantage are left to the parish. But there are purposes which only the State as a whole can fulfill. To these belong national defence, the general system of communications, and, indeed, everything spoken of in article 4 of the constitution. To these, too, belong the help of the necessitous and the removal of those just complaints which provide Social Democracy with really effective material for agitation. This is a duty of the State, a duty which the State cannot permanently disregard.... As soon as the State takes this matter [of insurance] in hand—and I believe it is its duty to take it in hand—it must seek the cheapest form of insurance, and, not aiming at profit for itself, must keep primarily in view the benefit of the poor and needy. Otherwise we might leave the fulfillment of certain State duties—such as poor relief, in the widest sense of the words, is amongst others—like education and national defence with more right to share companies, only asking ourselves, Who will do it most cheaply? who will do it most effectively? If provision for the necessitous in a greater degree than is possible with the present poor relief legislation is a State duty, the State must take the matter in hand; it cannot rest content with the thought that a share company will undertake it.

If an establishment employing twenty thousand or more workpeople were to be ruined.... we could not allow these men to hunger. We should have to resort to real State Socialism and find work for them, and this is what we do in every case of distress. If the objection were right that we should shun State Socialism as we would an infectious disease, how do we come to organise works in one province and another in case of distress—works which we should not undertake if the labourers had employment and wages? In such cases we build railways whose profitability is questionable; we carry out improvements which otherwise would be left to private initiative. If that is Communism, I have no objection at all to it; though with such catchwords we really get no further.

Part 2. German Unification by "Blood and Iron"

THE GERMAN STATES (1789-1848)

1. Factors Promoting Unity

a. Common Nationality. In the late 18th century some German people began to think of themselves as a distinct nationality and agitated for a unified fatherland. This nationalist awakening reflected the efforts of German educators, poets, writers, historians, and philosophers.

b. Napoleon's Influence. Napoleon aided German unification, although unintentionally. He aroused German nationalism against him, weakened Austrian authority in Germany by abolishing the Holy Roman Empire, and reduced the more than 300 German states to less than 100.

c. Congress of Vienna. The peace conference of 1815 helped German unity, although unwittingly. It reduced the number of German states to 38 and organized them into an Austrian-dominated league of rulers, the *German Confederation*. The Confederation proved weak and ineffective, incapable of providing Germany with a unified government. Its failure stirred the people to seek unity by other means.

d. Zollverein. In 1819 Prussia formed a German customs union, which became known as the *Zollverein*. By the 1840's it included most German states, but not Austria. The Zollverein maintained free trade between member states, but high tariffs against nonmembers. The removal of internal tariff barriers benefited German merchants and manufacturers, and promoted the country's economic unity.

2. Factors Hindering Unity

a. Differences Among the German People. In Prussia and other north German states, the people were in the main Protestant, were interested in commerce, and were turning toward manufacturing. In Bavaria and other south German states, the people were predominantly Roman Catholic and were interested chiefly in agriculture. Outnumbered by the northerners, the south Germans realized that, in a united country, they would be a minority.

b. Opposition of Austria. Austria emerged from the Congress of Vienna as an influential central European Empire containing many different peoples. Austria's rulers, committed to the Metternich System (see pages 173-174), feared that the growth of nationalism, particularly in nearby Germany, might inspire their subject nationalities to seek independence. Consequently,

in 1819 Metternich induced the German Confederation to issue the *Carlsbad Decrees*. Aimed at suppressing liberal and nationalist ideas in Germany, these laws provided for (1) strict supervision of universities, teachers, and student organizations, and (2) censorship of newspapers, pamphlets, and books.

Austria's rulers also realized that, in the event of German unification, they would lose their influence over German affairs.

c. Opposition of the Lesser German States. The rulers and officials of the smaller German states feared that a unified Germany might centralize governmental power, thereby cutting their authority.

d. Opposition of France. French leaders feared that a unified Germany would be sufficiently powerful to challenge France's leadership in Europe. Furthermore, the French felt militarily more secure with weak, disunited neighbors.

FAILURE OF THE 1848 REVOLUTION

German liberals led a series of revolts in 1848 aimed at ending autocracy and unifying Germany. Encouraged by early successes, they convened a parliament, the *Frankfurt Assembly*. The liberals prepared a democratic constitution, proclaimed a united Germany, and, after months of debate, offered the position of Emperor to the King of Prussia. He rejected the Assembly's offer as "a crown out of the gutter" and also because he feared that acceptance might lead to war with Austria. Since the liberals lacked the military power to enforce unification, the King's refusal spelled the failure of the Frankfurt Assembly.

The conservatives regained control throughout the German states, and the liberals experienced severe persecution. Many fled the country. A considerable number came to the United States, where they contributed to our growing democracy.

In Germany, the way was now open for the successful attempt at unity under autocratic leadership.

LEADERS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION

1. Bismarck, appointed chief minister of Prussia in 1862, belonged to the dominant, landowning aristocracy, the *Junkers*. A reactionary who despised democracy, Bismarck planned to unite Germany—not by speeches and votes as at the Frankfurt Assembly, but by "blood and iron."

2. William I, King of Prussia (1861-1888), who became Emperor of Germany in 1871, fully supported Bismarck's policies.

3. Moltke, Prussian general and chief of staff, contributed to Bismarck's success by building a strong army and achieving impressive military victories.

STEPS IN GERMAN UNIFICATION (1862-1871)

1. Creation of Prussian Military Power. In 1862 the government's request for increased military funds was defeated in the Prussian legislature, whose liberal majority opposed militarism. Thereupon, Bismarck ignored the lawmakers and, from 1862 to 1867, in violation of the constitution, governed virtually as a dictator. He and Moltke created a Prussian military machine second to none.

2. Elimination of Austrian Influence


a. *The Danish War (1864)*. Bismarck brought about the war with Denmark over the provinces of *Schleswig* and *Holstein*. Prussia, joined by Austria, easily defeated Denmark and compelled that country to cede Schleswig-Holstein.

b. *The Austro-Prussian War (1866)*. Bismarck deliberately quarreled with Austria regarding the administration of the conquered provinces. Actually, Bismarck provoked war so as to end Austrian power in Germany. Most of the German states supported Austria to oppose Prussian dominance. Prussia was allied with Italy, which wanted the Italian territory held by Austria. General von Moltke's armies overwhelmed Austria so quickly that the war is called the *Seven Weeks' War*.

By the treaty of peace, Austria agreed to (1) yield Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia, (2) cede Venetia to Italy, and (3) dissolve the Austrian-dominated German Confederation, thus withdrawing from German affairs. By treating Austria generously, Bismarck expected to gain its friendship for the emerging German state.

3. Establishment of the North German Confederation (1867). Following the Austro-Prussian War, Bismarck annexed several north German states and compelled the remaining ones to join in a Prussian-dominated *North German Confederation*. Only the four south German states remained outside the Confederation, but they were tied to Prussia by the Zollverein and a defensive military alliance.

4. The Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). Bismarck now desired a war with France, so that the south Germans, by fighting a common enemy and experiencing wartime nationalism, would voluntarily merge into a Prussian-controlled unified Germany. When France opposed a German candidate for the Spanish throne, Bismarck seized the opportunity. He intensified Franco-German enmity by rewriting a vital telegram, the *Ems Dispatch*. Thus pro-



The Unification of Germany Under Prussian Leadership

voked, Napoleon III declared war upon Prussia, which was joined by the four south German states. General von Moltke's armies invaded France, destroyed the French forces at *Sedan*, and quickly overran the country.

In the *Treaty of Frankfurt*, France (a) ceded *Alsace-Lorraine* to Germany (these provinces, rich in coal and iron, were inhabited mostly by Frenchmen), (b) agreed to pay Germany a huge war indemnity, and (c) until final payment, consented to German military occupation. By treating France harshly, Bismarck planted the seeds of World War I.

5. Establishment of the German Empire (1871). During the Franco-Prussian War, the four south German states consented to unification with Prussia. In January, 1871, at Versailles, Bismarck proclaimed William I as Emperor (*Kaiser*) of the German Empire.

Bismarck's success—by military might and autocratic rule—established a tradition that, according to many historians, greatly impeded the development of democracy in Germany.

THE GERMAN EMPIRE: UNDEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

1. **Autocracy.** (a) Unlike the English King, the German ruler was no figurehead. The Kaiser commanded the armed forces, conducted foreign affairs, and appointed his choices to major government positions. (b) The *Chancellor* (Prime Minister) and other cabinet members were responsible to the Kaiser, not to the legislature. (c) In the two-house legislature, the *Bundesrat*—whose members were appointed by the heads of the various states—exercised important law-making powers; the popularly elected *Reichstag* had few powers.

2. **Prussian Domination.** Prussia contained almost two-thirds of the area and the population of the Empire. The King of Prussia automatically became Emperor of Germany. The chief minister of Prussia usually served as Chancellor of Germany. Prussia controlled enough votes in the *Bundesrat* to block any military law, tax measure, or constitutional amendment.

THE GERMAN EMPIRE UNDER BISMARCK'S DIRECTION (1871-1890)

As Germany's *Iron Chancellor*, Bismarck pursued conservative and nationalist policies.

1. **Centralization of Power.** To promote uniformity within Germany, the national government took away from the states their control over railways, telegraph lines, postal service, banking, and coinage. Also, national codes of law replaced the varying state legal systems.

2. **Continuation of Militarism.** The Empire adopted the Prussian system of compulsory, peacetime military service. Militarism was extolled by government officials, patriotic societies, and nationalist writers. In conducting foreign affairs, Bismarck emphasized military alliances.

3. **Encouragement of Industrialization.** Unification encouraged economic growth. Germany rapidly changed from an agricultural to a predominantly industrial nation and experienced great prosperity. The German government, eager to attain economic self-sufficiency, assisted the industrialists by (a) *high tariffs* to protect home industry against foreign competitors, and (b) *imperialism* to secure colonial raw materials and markets.

4. **Persecution of Subject Nationalities.** Bismarck tried to compel the Empire's minorities—Poles, Danes, and Frenchmen—to forsake their own cultures and adopt German ways. Despite persecution, these minority groups resisted *Germanization*.

5. **Measures Against Catholics.** The German Catholics, who inhabited chiefly the four southern states, opposed Bismarck and feared domination

by Protestant Prussia. To protect their interests, Catholics organized the *Center party*, which advocated stronger states' rights. Bismarck opposed the Catholics because of their attitude on states' rights and because of their ties to the Pope. This loyalty to an international Church, Bismarck believed, evidenced a lack of German nationalism.

To weaken the Catholic Church, Bismarck in 1872 started a struggle called, by his supporters, the battle for civilization, or *Kulturkampf*. He secured laws placing the Catholic clergy under state control, ending Church influence in education, and requiring civil marriage ceremonies. These measures, denounced by the Pope and defied by clergy and laymen, intensified Catholic resistance and helped the Center party increase its representation in the *Reichstag*. Eventually, Bismarck permitted the repeal of most of the anti-Catholic laws as he realized their failure and desired Catholic support against another enemy, the Socialists.

6. **Measures Against the Socialists.** As German industry grew, city workers became more numerous and sought higher wages and better working conditions. The workers voted for the *Reichstag* candidates of the *Social Democratic (Socialist) party*. The Socialists pleaded the workers' cause and denounced Bismarck's policies of autocracy and militarism. Bismarck detested the Socialists because of their democratic, antimilitarist attitude and their ties to the international Socialist movement. He felt that supporters of any worldwide organization could not be true German patriots.

To combat the German Socialists, Bismarck employed: (a) *Repression*. In 1878 he secured laws which forbade Socialist meetings, banned their publications, and subjected their leaders to arrest. (b) *Social Security*. Bismarck believed that the workers would reject the Socialist party if they received government help toward economic security. Between 1883 and 1889, therefore, he secured laws to assist workers financially in case of sickness, accident, and old age. (Bismarck's social insurance program set an example later followed by most industrial nations. See pages 241-242.)

Neither repressive laws nor social legislation weakened Socialism in Germany. Even operating under severe handicaps, the Socialist party spread its ideas and even increased its *Reichstag* membership.

7. **Foreign Policies.** See page 335.

THE GERMAN EMPIRE UNDER WILLIAM II

In 1888 *William II*, a strong-willed believer in the "divine right" of kings, inherited the throne. Determined to direct German affairs personally, the new Kaiser in 1890 dismissed Bismarck from office.

Kaiser William II reversed two of Bismarck's policies: friendship for Russia and repression of Socialists. Otherwise he maintained Bismarckian conservatism and nationalism. William ruled autocratically. He favored Junker landlords, industrialists, and military officers; strengthened the army and built an imposing navy; and furthered imperialism.

The Kaiser's policies of militarism and imperialism helped bring about World War I. Still later, Adolf Hitler followed a course of militarism and imperialism, and brought on World War II.

ITALY: A "GEOGRAPHIC EXPRESSION"

1. Factors Hindering Unity

a. Political Divisions. At the Congress of Vienna Italy was divided into many states and provinces. Most pre-Napoleonic boundaries were restored. According to Metternich, Italy would not be a united nation, but a "geographic expression." The Congress divided the country as follows: (1) The kingdom of *Sardinia-Piedmont* (also called Sardinia or Piedmont)—under Italian control. (2) The provinces of *Lombardy* and *Venetia*—annexed to Austria. (3) The duchies of *Parma*, *Modena*, and *Tuscany*, as well as the *Kingdom of the Two Sicilies* (also called Naples)—under local rulers dominated by Austria. (4) The *Papal States*—under Church control.

b. Opposition of Austria. The rulers of Austria fought Italian unification (1) to discourage nationalist uprisings within their Empire, (2) to retain Lombardy and Venetia, and (3) to maintain Austrian influence elsewhere in Italy.

c. Opposition of the Papacy. Church leaders believed that a united Italy would end the Pope's temporal rule over the Papal States.

d. Discord Among Nationalists. The leading Italian nationalists were in conflict on a type of government for a united Italy. *Mazzini* and *Garibaldi* sought a democratic Italian republic; *Gioberti* urged an Italian federation under the leadership of the Pope; *Cavour*, an admirer of the English government, worked for a liberal Italian monarchy.

2. Factors Promoting Unity

a. National Feeling. Beginning with the Napoleonic Era the Italians became increasingly conscious of their nationality. They recalled the past glory of Italy during the Roman Empire and the Renaissance, resented their present subjugation to Austria, and desired unity and greatness.

b. Patriotic Societies

(1) The *Carbonari*, a secret society of limited membership, conspired to overthrow tyranny. They fomented uprisings in 1820, 1821, and 1831, but the uprisings were all suppressed by Austria. Thereafter, Carbonari secrecy and intrigue lost favor among Italian nationalists.

(2) *Young Italy*, founded in 1831 by Mazzini, was a nonsecret society. It openly and successfully propagandized democratic and nationalist ideas among the people.

c. Leadership of Sardinia-Piedmont. Ruled by the *House of Savoy*, a patriotic Italian family, Sardinia aspired to unify Italy. In 1848 the King of Sardinia granted his people a liberal constitution and led his armies in support of an Italian uprising against Austria. The Sardinians were defeated, and Austria reestablished her control within Italy. Although unsuccessful in 1848, Sardinia-Piedmont won the loyalty of Italian nationalists.

LEADERS OF ITALIAN UNIFICATION

1. Mazzini, writer, orator, and founder of Young Italy, dedicated his life to securing democracy and unity for his country. Preaching through newspapers, pamphlets, and speeches, Mazzini transmitted his patriotic ardor to the masses. In the Revolution of 1848, his followers seized the Papal States, and Mazzini proclaimed the Roman Republic. When French troops crushed this uprising, he fled the country and continued his propaganda efforts from abroad. Mazzini has been called the *soul* of unification.

2. Garibaldi, a friend of Mazzini, was a military leader. He defended Mazzini's Roman Republic against the French, several times fought for Sardinia against Austria, and in 1860 conquered the Two Sicilies. Garibaldi was known as the *sword* of unification.

3. Cavour, liberal statesman appointed Prime Minister of Sardinia-Piedmont in 1852, strengthened the country by promoting industry, building railroads, improving agriculture, fostering education, and enlarging the army. Until his death in 1861, he executed a series of diplomatic moves to achieve Italian unity. Cavour has been called the *brain* of unification.

4. Victor Emmanuel II, who became King of Sardinia-Piedmont in 1849, retained his nation's liberal constitution and fully supported Cavour's policies. In 1861 he became King of Italy.

THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONALISM

SARDINIA-PIEDMONT UNIFIES ITALY BY TERRITORIAL ANNEXATIONS (1859-1870)

1. Lombardy (1859). Shrewdly, Cavour won Napoleon III's pledge of military assistance if Austria attacked Sardinia. Thereupon, Cavour maneuvered Austria into declaring war. In a short conflict, French and Sardinian troops defeated the Austrians. As a result of the war, (a) Austria ceded Lombardy to Sardinia, and (b) following a plebiscite, Sardinia ceded Savoy and Nice to France.

Sardinia's success aroused nationalist revolts elsewhere.



The Unification of Italy Under Sardinia-Piedmont

2. **The Duchies (1860).** In Parma, Modena, and Tuscany, the people drove out their pro-Austrian rulers and, by plebiscites, voted annexation to Sardinia-Piedmont.

3. **The Two Sicilies (1860).** In 1860 Garibaldi came to the aid of the Sicilian and Neapolitan revolutionaries. He sailed from Piedmont to Sicily with a volunteer army of one thousand *Red Shirts*. Garibaldi, joined by rebels throughout southern Italy, soon gained complete control of the Two Sicilies. In the national interest, Garibaldi put aside his republican sentiments and proposed that the Two Sicilies unite with Sardinia under Victor Emmanuel II. By a plebiscite, the southern Italians so voted.

4. **The Papal States (1860).** While Garibaldi conquered the Two Sicilies, Cavour ordered Sardinian troops into the Papal States. The Sardinians, welcomed by nationalist groups, overran central Italy. Cavour then announced the annexation of the Papal States (except for Rome), thereby joining northern and southern Italy. In 1861 the Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed.

5. **Venetia (1866).** Italy allied herself with Prussia in the Seven Weeks' War against Austria. The Italians invaded Venetia but were defeated. However, the Prussian armies quickly overwhelmed the Austrians. By the peace treaty, Austria ceded Venetia to Italy.

6. **Rome (1870).** Because of the Franco-Prussian War, French troops supporting the Pope in Rome were withdrawn. Thereupon, Italian forces occupied the city. Following a plebiscite, Rome was annexed and designated the capital of Italy.

PROBLEMS FACING ITALY AFTER UNIFICATION

1. **Government Weaknesses.** Italy's limited monarchy featured a King with few powers, an elected Chamber of Deputies, and a cabinet responsible to the Chamber of Deputies. Although modeled after England's parliamentary system, the Italian government operated far less successfully. (a) The Italian masses, illiterate and impoverished, lacked a democratic tradition and demonstrated little public responsibility. (b) Until 1904, when the Pope relaxed the ban forbidding Catholics to take part in the Italian government, devout Catholics shunned government positions, and did not vote. (c) Until 1912, when universal manhood suffrage was adopted, only the wealthier classes could vote. (d) The existence of many political parties caused a number of cabinet crises. (e) Bribery and corruption pervaded public life.

2. **Church Hostility.** The Italian government sought to make peace with the Papacy. By the *Law of Papal Guarantees* of 1871, Italy (a) acknowledged Papal rule of an independent Vatican state within Rome, and (b) offered the Papacy an annual indemnity. Pope Pius IX rejected these terms, denying Italy's right to seize the Papal States. Until this dispute was settled in 1929 (see page 370), the Popes considered themselves "prisoners" in the Vatican.

3. **Poor Economic Conditions.** Italy lacked the coal, iron, and oil necessary for extensive industrialization; she also lacked sufficient fertile land to support her increasing population. Despite government efforts to improve economic conditions, living standards remained low. Many Italians migrated to South America and to the United States.

4. **Ambitious Nationalism.** Italy also weakened herself by trying to play the part of a great world power. (a) *Militarism.* Italy adopted compulsory military service and maintained a large army and navy. (b) *Imperialism.* Italy acquired the African colonies of Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, and Libya. (Italy's attempt to conquer Ethiopia in 1896 met with defeat.) (c) *World War I.* By joining the Allies and fighting Austria, Italy gained most of her *Italia Irredenta* (unredeemed Italy): *Trentino, Istria, and Trieste.*

Italy's nationalist policies placed heavy personal and financial burdens upon the people. Nevertheless, nationalist feeling remained strong and, after World War I, helped pave the way for Fascist rule under Mussolini (see pages 368-371).