

UNIT 7: REACTION VERSUS PROGRESS: 1815 - 1848

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Industrialism in Britain: Incentives and Inventions
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Section B: The Advent of the "Isms"

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Key France, 1824 - 1830: The July Revolution, 1830
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Reform in Great Britain
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Section F: Triumph of the West European Bourgeoisie

Reading Palmer and Colton: 476 - 482

Self-Help: Middle -Class Attitudes- Smiles
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The First Chartist Petition: Demands for Change in England

Key The Frustration and Challenge of Labor
Topics Socialism and Chartism

Unit 7: Identifications and Study Questions

Section A: The Industrial Revolution in Britain

"squierarchy", enclosure acts, John Kay, Richard Arkwright, James Watt, spinning jenny, George Stephenson, power loom, Factory Act of 1802, Adam Smith, Malthus, Ricardo's "iron law of wages", laissez faire, free trade

1. What is meant by the Industrial Revolution? Why may it be said that it was not a revolution at all?
2. Of what basic significance for the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain was the Agricultural Revolution? Why and how was the older system of cultivation superseded?
3. What combination of circumstances helped to create a favorable environment for the emergence of machine industry in Britain?
4. Describe the changes that took place in Britain from about 1780 to 1840 in the textile industry and in other industries?
5. What important population and urban changes accompanied the Industrial Revolution in Britain? Why was it difficult to deal with the problems of rapid urbanization?
6. How did the new factory system affect the working classes?
7. Explain the attitude toward government regulation of business of the new cotton lords and the classical economists.

Section B: The Advent of the "Isms"

Gothic Revival, Liberal, Joseph Mazzini, *Grimms' Fairy Tales*, Slavic Revival, *History of the Czech People*, liberalism, Philosophic Radicals, Jeremy Bentham, Robert Owen, Count de Saint-Simon, Hegelian dialectic, Leopold von Ranke, Friedrich List, Charles Fourier, Louis Blanc, Slavophilism, Edmund Burke, Carbonari

1. How may an "ism" be defined? Which "isms" still important today made their appearance in the years immediately after 1815? Why did they first emerge in those years?
2. How did the attitudes of Romanticism differ from those of the enlightenment?
3. What beliefs in political and economic matters did nineteenth century liberals generally share?
4. What position did the English Radicals take toward the political and social conditions of their day? the republicans on the continent? the early socialists?
5. Why was nationalism inherently revolutionary in this age?

Section C: The Dike and the Flood: Domestic

Metternich, Alexander I, Duke de Berry, Charles X, "white terror", "Congress Poland," Burschenschaft, Wartburg congress, Carlsbad Decrees, Corn Laws, Peterloo Massacre, Six Acts

1. Explain the principle objectives after 1815 of the governments that had defeated Napoleon. Why was it difficult to maintain political stability?
2. What political developments were taking place in France under Louis XVIII and his successor?
3. Why did the regime established for Poland by the Vienna peace settlement fail to work?
4. Describe the nationalist activities in the German states in the years after 1815. What action did Metternich take?
5. Describe the cycle of popular unrest and government repression in Great Britain after 1815. How did economic factors contribute to the spread of political radicalism?
6. How would you summarize the domestic policies followed in almost every European country immediately after 1815? What is meant by the "dike" and the "flood" in the title of this section?

Section D: The Dike and the Flood: International

Holy Alliance, "congress system", protocol of Troppau, Joseph Bonaparte, Monroe Doctrine, Decembrist revolt, Ypsilanti

1. Explain the origin of the congresses of the Great Powers held in the years after 1815. What was their long-range significance?
2. What decisions did the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle make with respect to France? What happened to Alexander's more general proposals for international action?
3. What events led to the summoning of the Congress of Troppau? Why could Metternich win Alexander to his views, yet fail to persuade Castlereagh and the British? How was the revolution in Naples handled?
4. Describe the efforts that led to the Congress of Verona. What happened to the Greek effort and revolution? How was the revolution in Spain handled? With what results?
5. Explain the background, nature and results of the revolt in Russia after Alexander's death.
6. Why did the congresses after 1815 fail to make progress toward international order? With what consequences for liberalism in Europe?

Section E: The Breakthrough of Liberalism in the West: The Revolutions of 1832

July ordinances, Louis Philippe, Tory reforms of 1820s, Catholic Emancipation Act, Duke of Wellington, Municipal Corporations Act, Factory of 1833, Mines Act of 1842, Ten Hours Act of 1847, Anti-Corn Law League, Lord Palmerston

1. Explain the nature of the Greek independence movement.
2. What accounted for the July Revolution in France? Explain the division of opinion in the groups that favored the revolution. How was the conflict resolved?
3. Discuss the constitutional and political changes that took place under Louis Philippe. What classes benefited? What classes remained dissatisfied?
4. What immediate effects did the revolutions in France in 1830 have throughout Europe? What arrangements made by the Congress of Vienna were now undone?
5. Explain the effect upon England of the 1830 revolution in France. Describe the events that led to the passage of the Reform Bill of 1832 and the major accomplishments of the bill. How close to revolution was England?
6. Summarize the reforms introduced in Britain after 1832. Why was the repeal of the Corn Laws significant?

Section F: Triumph of the West European Bourgeoisie

July Monarchy, Manchester School, Poor Law of 1832, Chartism

1. Why may the decades immediately following 1830 be thought of as a kind of golden age of west-European bourgeoisie? How did the "stake in society" theory apply to France and Britain?
2. Describe the major economic developments taking place in this age.
3. What attitudes were emerging among working people in France and Britain? What could they do to improve their conditions?
4. Describe the objectives, nature and results of the Chartist movement. What change took place in British labor after the 1840s?

SECONDARY SOURCES

The Stages of Economic Growth

W. W. Rostow

The entire conception of industrialization has been debated for over a century. For most of that time, scholars have been willing to apply the term "Industrial Revolution," made popular by the elder Arnold Toynbee in the 1880s, to the great economic transformation that occurred in England between the late eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century and in other parts of Europe somewhat later. But more recent and more detailed research has led historians to question the usefulness of that term. During the last three decades, economic historians have been turning to such terms as "economic modernization" and "economic growth." Moreover, these historians have been applying new models from the social sciences to these historical processes. One of the most daring and influential works written along these lines is *The Stages of Economic Growth* (1960) by W. W. Rostow. A historian and former high official in the Kennedy administration, Rostow argues that industrialization generally takes place in five stages. It is the third stage that constitutes what we usually think of as the Industrial Revolution. In the following selection, Rostow summarizes the first three stages.

Consider: What periods each of these three stages would cover; how government action could influence what occurs in each stage.

It is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories: the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption. . . .

First, the traditional society. A traditional society is one whose structure is developed within limited production functions, based on pre-Newtonian science and technology, and on pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world. Newton is here used as a symbol for that watershed in history when men came widely to believe that the external world was subject to a few knowable laws, and was systematically capable of productive manipulation. . . .

The second stage of growth embraces societies in the process of transition; that is, the period when the preconditions for take-off are developed; for it takes time to transform a traditional society in the ways necessary for it to exploit the fruits of modern science, to fend off diminishing returns, and

Source: W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*. Reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, England, 1960), pp. 4, 6-7, 18-19.

thus to enjoy the blessings and choices opened up by the march of compound interest.

The preconditions for take-off were initially developed in a clearly marked way, in Western Europe of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries as the insights of modern science began to be translated into new production functions in both agriculture and industry, in a setting given dynamism by the lateral expansion of world markets and the international competition for them. But all that lies behind the break-up of the Middle Ages is relevant to the creation of the preconditions for take-off in Western Europe. Among the Western European states, Britain favoured by geography, natural resources, trading possibilities, social and political structure, was the first to develop fully the preconditions for take-off. . . . We come now to the great watershed in the life of modern societies: the third stage in this sequence, the take-off. The take-off is the interval when the old blocks and resistances to steady growth are finally overcome. The forces making for economic progress, which yielded limited bursts and enclaves of modern activity, expand and come to dominate the society. Growth becomes its normal condition. Compound interest becomes hilt, as it were, into its habits and institutional structure. . . . The transition we are examining has, evidently, many dimensions. A society predominantly agricultural—with, in fact, usually 75% or more of its working force in agriculture—must shift to a pre-dominance for industry, communications, trade and services.

A society whose economic, social and political arrangements are built around the life of relatively small—mainly self-sufficient—regions must orient its commerce and its thought to the nation and to a still larger international setting.

The view towards the having of children—initially the residual blessing and affirmation of immortality in a hard life, of relatively fixed horizons—must change in ways which ultimately yield a decline in the birth-rate, as the possibility of progress and the decline in the need for unskilled farm labour create a new calculus.

The income above minimum levels of consumption, largely concentrated in the hands of those who own land, must be shifted into the hands of those who will spend it on roads and railroads, schools and factories rather than on country houses and servants, personal ornaments and temples.

Men must come to be valued in the society not for their connexion with clan or class, or, even, their guild; but for their individual ability to perform certain specific, increasingly specialized functions.

And, above all, the concept must be spread that man need not regard his physical environment as virtually a factor given by nature and providence, but as an ordered world which, if rationally understood, can be manipulated in ways which yield productive change and, in one dimension at least, progress.

All of this—and more—is involved in the passage of a traditional to a modern growing society.

The Making of Economic Society: England, the First to Industrialize

Robert Heilbroner

Although it is clear that industrialization occurred first in England, it is not apparent why this should be so. During the eighteenth century France was prosperous and economically advanced. Other countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands possessed certain economic advantages over England and might have industrialized earlier but did not. In the following selection Robert Heilbroner, an economist and economic historian, addresses the question of why England was first and points out the differences between England and most other European nations in the eighteenth century.

Consider: Why Heilbroner stresses the role of the "New Men" over the other factors he lists; any disadvantages England had to overcome; whether it was simply the circumstances that gave rise to the "New Men" or whether it was the "New Men" who took advantage of the circumstances when most men in most other nations would not have.

Why did the Industrial Revolution originally take place in England and not on the continent? To answer the question we must look at the background factors which distinguished England from most other European nations in the eighteenth century.

The first of these factors was simply that England was relatively wealthy. In fact, a century of successful exploration, slave-trading, piracy, war, and commerce had made her the richest nation in the world. Even more important, her riches had accrued not merely to a few nobles, but to a large upper-middle stratum of commercial bourgeoisie. England was thus one of the first nations to develop, albeit on a small scale, a prime requisite of an industrial economy: a "mass" consumer market. As a result, a rising pressure of demand inspired a search for new techniques.

Second, England was the scene of the most successful and thorough-going transformation of feudal society into commercial society. A succession of strong kings had effectively broken the power of the local nobility and had made England into a single unified state. As part of this process, we also find in England the strongest encouragement to the rising mercantile classes. Then too, as we have seen, the enclosure movement, which gained in tempo in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, expelled an army of laborers to man her new industrial establishments.

Source: Robert L. Heilbroner, *The Making of Economic Society*. Reprinted by permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1980), pp. 76-77, 80-81.

Third, England was the locus of a unique enthusiasm for science and engineering. The famous Royal Academy, of which Newton was an early president, was founded in 1660 and was the immediate source of much intellectual excitement. Indeed, a popular interest in gadgets, machines, and devices of all sorts soon became a mild national obsession: *Gentleman's Magazine*, a kind of *New Yorker* of the period, announced in 1729 that it would henceforth keep its readers "abreast of every invention"—a task which the mounting flow of inventions soon rendered quite impossible. No less important was an enthusiasm of the British landed aristocracy for scientific farming: English landlords displayed an interest in matters of crop rotation and fertilizer which their French counterparts would have found quite beneath their dignity.

Then there were a host of other background causes, some as fortuitous as the immense resources of coal and iron ore on which the British sat; others as purposeful as the development of a national patent system which deliberately sought to stimulate and protect the act of invention itself. In many ways, England was "ready" for an Industrial Revolution. But perhaps what finally translated the potentiality into an actuality was the emergence of a group of new men who seized upon the latent opportunities of history as a vehicle for their own rise to fame and fortune. . . .

Pleasant or unpleasant, the personal characteristics fade beside one overriding quality. These were all men interested in expansion, in growth, in investment for investment's sake. All of them were identified with technological progress, and none of them disdained the productive process. An employee of Maudslay's once remarked, "It was a pleasure to see him handle a tool of any kind, but he was quite splendid with an 18-inch file." Watt was tireless in experimenting with his machines; Wedgwood stomped about his factory on his wooden leg scrawling, "This won't do for Jos. Wedgwood," wherever he saw evidence of careless work. Richard Arkwright was a bundle of ceaseless energy in promoting his interests, jouncing about England over execrable roads in a post chaise driven by four horses, pursuing his correspondence as he traveled.

"With us," wrote a French visitor to a calico works in 1788, "a man rich enough to set up and run a factory like this would not care to remain in a position which he would deem unworthy of his wealth." This was an attitude entirely foreign to the rising English industrial capitalist. His work was its own dignity and reward; the wealth it brought was quite aside. Boswell, on being shown Watt and Boulton's great engine works at Soho, declared that he never forgot Boulton's expression as the latter declared, "I sell here, sir, what all the world desires to have—Power."

The New Men were first and last *entrepreneurs*—enterprisers. They brought with them a new energy, as restless as it proved to be inexhaustible. In an economic, if not a political, sense, they deserve the epithet "revolutionaries," for the change they ushered in was nothing short of total, sweeping, and irreversible.

Factory Discipline in the Industrial Revolution

Sidney Pollard

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workers to
factory
discipline

One of the most difficult problems in the process of industrialization involved acclimatizing workers to the kind of work and discipline that took place in a factory. From the workers' point of view, this required not only changing how actual tasks were carried out, but altering their attitudes, expectations, and behavior patterns. From the employers' point of view, this meant training large numbers of people to work in new ways, to accept new conditions of work, and to develop values appropriate to factory discipline. The following selection by Sidney Pollard, an economic historian from the University of Sheffield, deals with this problem from the employers' point of view during the early period of industrialization in England.

Consider: The aids the employer had in training his new work force and the problems he faced; the effects on the lives of the workers of these attempts by employers to acclimatize them to factory discipline; the ways in which this perspective on entrepreneurs differs from Heilbroner's.

- ① First, the acclimatization of new workers to factory discipline is a task different in kind, at once more subtle and more violent, from that of maintaining discipline among a proletarian population of long standing. Employers in the British Industrial Revolution therefore used not only industrial means but a whole battery of extra-mural powers, including their control over the courts, their powers as landlords, and their own ideology, to impose the control they required.
- ② Secondly, the maintenance of discipline, like the whole field of management itself, was not considered a fit subject for study, still less a science, but merely a matter of the employer's individual character and ability. No books were written on it before 1830, no teachers lectured on it, there were no entries about it in the technical encyclopaedias, no patents were taken out relating to it. As result, employers did not learn from each other, except haphazardly and belatedly, new ideas did not have the cachet of a new technology and did not spread, and the crudest form of deterrents and incentives remained the rule. Robert Owen was exceptional in ensuring that his methods, at least, were widely known, but they were too closely meshed in with his social doctrines to be acceptable to other employers.
- ③ Lastly, the inevitable emphasis on reforming the moral character of the worker into a willing machine-minder led to a logical dilemma that contemporaries did not know how to escape. (For if the employer had it in his power to reform the workers if he but tried hard enough, whose fault was it that most of them remained immoral, idle and rebellious?) And if the workers could really be taught their employers' virtues, would they not all save and borrow and become entrepreneurs themselves, and who would then man the factories?

The Industrial Revolution happened too rapidly for these dilemmas, which involved the re-orientation of a whole class, to be solved, as it were, *en passant*. The assimilation of the formerly independent worker to the needs of factory routine took at least a further generation, and was accompanied by the help of tradition, by a sharply differentiated educational system, and new ideologies which were themselves the results of clashes of earlier systems of values, besides the forces operating before 1830. The search of a more scientific approach which would collaborate with and use, instead of seeking to destroy, the workers' own values, began later still, and may hardly be said to have advanced very far even to-day.

The First Industrial Revolution

Phyllis Deane

One of the most persistent debates over the early stages of the Industrial Revolution is whether a higher standard of living resulted for factory workers. A number of "optimistic" historians, relying primarily on statistical evidence such as wage rates, prices, and mortality rates, have argued that even during the early period factory workers experienced a rising standard of living. A group of more "pessimistic" historians, emphasizing qualitative data such as descriptions of the psychological, social, and cultural impact of the factory on workers' lives, argues that the standard of living declined for these workers during the first half of the nineteenth century. In the following selection Phyllis Deane, a Cambridge scholar and author of *The First Industrial Revolution* (1965), focuses on this debate. Although she is generally associated with the optimistic historians, the conclusion she presents here is a more balanced one that recognizes the validity of points from both sides of the debate.

Consider: The aspects of this selection that optimistic historians would emphasize and how pessimistic historians would respond; whether increased wage rates are meaningful without a consideration of the psychological and social costs of that extra money.

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(It seems then that if the working classes earned more and spent more in 1850 than the labouring poor of the pre-industrial times, they paid for it in hard toil. The industrial revolution gave them a chance to better themselves by working harder. It had not yet given them anything for nothing by 1850. If we were to set against the welfare represented by higher money incomes and lower prices for manufactures (though not for food) the disutility of longer, harder working hours, it is doubtful whether the balance would be tipped in their favour. For many of them life on these terms was only acceptable if heavily laced with strong liquor; and drunkenness, together with the degradation and cruelty to which it gives rise, was one of the characteristic features of the English scene in the mid-nineteenth century — as it had been of course a hundred years or so before, in the gin age. Strong drink caused endless trouble to the employers of labour, as the railway builders frequently complained, and it had an important influence on the outcome of parliamentary elections. It drew a firm line between the classes of society, between the respectable and the disreputable, between the two nations of rich and poor, in a way that was not nearly so evident in the eighteenth century.

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(Compared with what it had been a century before then, the standard of living of the British people in 1850 was higher on the average and a great deal more varied. It was also, for a larger number of people (if a smaller proportion of the population) more vulnerable and more squalid. For many more still, it was achieved at the cost of more labouring effort. The workers in a pre-industrial society have their hours of work dictated by the seasons, by the weather, by the hours of daylight and darkness and by the limited number of opportunities for gainful employment open to the weaker members of the community (the women and children for example). Their leisure is not always of their own choosing, though it is not therefore valueless. In an industrial society work can go on throughout the year and through the night, so long as the output can find a market, and there are many gainful tasks for unskilled and relatively feeble hands.)

The Family and Industrialization in Western Europe

Michael Anderson

The tremendous growth of interest in social history over the past twenty years has stimulated scholars from other disciplines to address historical questions. A number of sociologists have applied methods from their own discipline to social aspects of nineteenth-century industrialization. In the following selection Michael Anderson, a sociologist from the University of Edinburgh, discusses the effects of industrialization on the working-class family.

Consider: The specific ways in which the process of industrialization affected working-class families; how Anderson's interpretation might support the "optimists" or the "pessimists" in their debate over the effects of the Industrial Revolution on the working class; how the effects on middle-class families might differ.

In industrial areas, then, the close interdependence of parents and children which was so important in peasant societies gave way, and this was reflected in changes in family relationship. The early stages of industrialization, however, probably changed relationships between husbands and wives much less, though freedom from such close supervision and a more private domestic situation may have allowed rather more affection to develop between them than had been the case in pre-industrial peasant families. Husband and wife were no longer cooperating in the same productive task, but this had never been universal anyway. There was, however, a continued need and possibility for both husbands and wives to work as producers to keep the family above the subsistence line. In a few areas wives actually left the house to work in the factories. More usually, as women had always done, the wives of factory workers worked at home producing small items of clothing, processing some kind of food or drink, taking in the middle class's washing, or running a small shop or lodging house. The manifold needs of an industrial community were thus met in a way which contributed to working class family solidarity while allowing mothers to supervise and care (perhaps rather better than before) for small children during the lengthening period before they were able to enter the labor force themselves.

Initially, then, it was only in a few areas, especially those specializing in mining, machine-making, metal manufacturing, shipbuilding and sawmilling, that a change occurred in the economic status of women and with it in their family situation. In these areas there were not enough openings for female wage employment and, in consequence, many women were forced into the almost totally new situation of full-time housewife. However, as more and more traditional tasks were taken over by the application of factory production methods to clothing and food preparation, the home increasingly became confined to consumption. Only then did the distinction between male productive work outside the home and female consumption-oriented work inside the home become common among the working class.

Though the evidence is patchy, it seems that, at least in some areas, this had an effect on relationships between husbands and wives. Since the husband became the only income producer, the rest of the family became more dependent on him than he was on them. Whatever the husband did, the wife had little power to resist. While the family as a whole relied materially

on the father, he needed them only to the extent that he could obtain from them emotional or other rewards which he could not obtain elsewhere or to the extent to which public opinion in the neighbourhood was effective in controlling his behavior (And with the weakened community control of large industrial cities, neighborhood control was often weak). Thus, in the working class, the idea that a woman's place was in the home and that her role was essentially an inferior domestic one is not of great antiquity. Rather it seems only to have developed as a response to a major shift in the power balance between husbands and wives which reflected the new employment situation of late nineteenth and early twentieth century industrial society.

Liberalism Defined

David Thomson

Although liberalism varied throughout Europe in accordance with the circumstances facing each country, there were broad similarities among the various liberal ideas and demands during the first half of the nineteenth century. In the following selection David Thomson, a Cambridge University historian who has written extensively on France and Great Britain, summarizes the common elements of liberal doctrine and attitudes in continental Europe.

Source: David Thomson, *Europe Since Napoleon*. Reprinted by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. (New York: 1958), pp. 103-104. Copyright © 1958 by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

Consider: How these doctrines and attitudes differ from conservatism; why liberalism would be more appealing to the middle class than to the aristocracy or the working class; the significance of the French Revolution for the development of liberal doctrines and attitudes.

Liberalism, in its continental European sense more clearly than in its English or American sense, was like nationalism in that it rested on the belief that there should be a more organic and complete relationship between government and the community, between state and society, than existed under the dynastic regimes of the eighteenth century. Instead of government and administration existing above and in many respects apart from society — the exclusive affair of kings and their ministers and officials — they should rest on the organized consent of at least the most important sections of the community, and they ought to concern themselves with the interests of the whole community. The ideas that Americans had asserted in 1776 had still not been accepted by European governments: ideas that "governments are instituted among men" to secure individual rights, and derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed." European liberals stood, fundamentally, for these American ideals. The biggest obstacles to a broader basis of government were the powers and privileges of the aristocracy and the Church, and the lack of privileges of the merchant, business, and manufacturing classes. Thus the spearhead of the liberal attack against feudal rights and clericalist power was, in each European country, the underprivileged middle and professional classes. It was these classes, backed in the course of events by the peasants and by the Paris mob, that had been the central driving force of the French Revolution, and the chief gainers from it.

In doctrine, therefore, continental liberalism derived from the rationalist movement of the eighteenth century which had made so corrosive an attack upon inequality and arbitrary power. Its most characteristic method was parliamentary government; it sought in constitutional arrangements and in the rule of law a means of expressing middle-class interests and opinion, a vehicle of social reform, and a safeguard against absolutist government. It was distinct from democracy, or radicalism, in that it favored ideas of the sovereignty of the people; it wanted an extension of the franchise to include all men of property but to exclude men without property; it valued liberty more highly than equality; and it appealed to broadly the same classes as the growing sense of nationalism. To liberals, the French Revolution had condemned itself by its excesses: the Reign of Terror and mob democracy had bred the era of reaction and led to military dictatorship. The most desirable regime was either a constitutional monarchy, guaranteeing certain rights equally to all citizens, or a parliamentary republic, resting on a restricted franchise but upholding the equality of all before the law. Their objections to the settlement of 1815 were less that it violated nationality than that it restored absolutism and threatened to restore aristocratic and clerical privileges.

Compare with middle class

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The Carlsbad Decrees, 1819: Conservative Repression

One way political leaders tried to assert conservatism against any perceived threats such as liberalism or nationalism was through international cooperation and action, a policy known as the Concert of Europe. Another way was through taking internal measures against the same threats, such as occurred in Germany in 1819 with the issuance of the Carlsbad Decrees. These decrees were pushed through the Diet of the German Confederation by Austria and Prussia, but particularly by Prince Metternich, in reaction to nationalist student movements against the principles of the Congress of Vienna. The following excerpts from those decrees concern the universities, the press, and all "revolutionary plots."

Consider: The purposes of these decrees and the means used to effect these purposes; whether these decrees are consistent with attitudes expressed by Metternich in the "confession of faith" he makes in his secret memorandum to Tsar Alexander I; the consequences of the effective enforcement of these decrees.

PROVISIONAL DECREE RELATING TO THE UNIVERSITIES, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED SEPTEMBER 20, 1819

§ 2. The confederated governments mutually pledge themselves to remove from the universities or other public educational institutions all teachers who, by obvious deviation from their duty or by exceeding the limits of their functions, or by the abuse of their legitimate influence over the youthful minds, or by propagating harmful doctrines hostile to public order or subversive of existing governmental institutions, shall have unmistakably proved their unfitness for the important office intrusted to them. . . .

§ 3. Those laws which have for a long period been directed against secret and unauthorized societies in the universities, shall be strictly enforced. These laws apply especially to that association established some years since under the name Universal Students' Union (*Allegemeine Burschenschaft*), since the very conception of the society implies the utterly unallowable plan of permanent fellowship and constant communication between the various universities. The duty of especial watchfulness in this matter should be impressed upon the special agents of the government.



PRESS LAWS FOR FIVE YEARS

§ 1. So long as this decree shall remain in force no publication which appears in the form of daily issues or as a serial not exceeding twenty sheets of printed matter shall go to press in any state of the Union without the previous knowledge and approval of the state officials.



§ 6. . . . The Diet shall have the right, moreover, to suppress on its own authority, without being petitioned, such writings included in Section 1, in whatever German state they may appear, as in the opinion of a commission appointed by it, are inimical to the honor of the Union, the safety of individual states or the maintenance of peace and quiet in Germany. There shall be no appeal from such decisions and the governments involved are bound to see that they are put into execution.



ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE AT MAINZ

ARTICLE I. Within a fortnight, reckoned from the passage of this decree, there shall convene, under the auspices of the Confederation, in the city and federal fortress of Mainz, an Extraordinary Commission of Investigation to consist of seven members including the chairman.

ARTICLE II. The object of the Commission shall be a joint investigation, as thorough and extensive as possible, of the facts relating to the origin and manifold ramifications of the revolutionary plots and demagogical associations directed against the existing Constitutional and internal peace both of the Union and of the individual states: of the existence of which plots more or less clear evidence is to be had already, or may be produced in the course of the investigation.

The Congress of Vienna

Hajo Holborn

Hindsight allows historians to evaluate diplomatic events with a sharply critical eye. Often great settlements between nations have been criticized for not taking into account the historical forces that would soon undo the stability that the peace treaties were supposed to establish. Although this critical view applies to the Congress of Vienna, there are historians who see it as relatively successful, particularly in comparison with the settlement after World War I. One of these historians is Hajo Holborn of Yale University. In the following selection Holborn evaluates the Congress of Vienna from the point of view of what was realistic for the parties at that time.

{ Consider: Why Holborn feels that the Congress of Vienna was a constructive peace treaty; how other historians might criticize this view. }

The Vienna settlement created a European political system whose foundations lasted for a full century. For a hundred years there occurred no wars of world-wide scope like those of the twenty-odd years after 1792. Europe experienced frightful wars, particularly between 1854 and 1878, but none of them was a war in which all the European states or even all the great European powers participated. The European wars of the nineteenth century produced shifts of power, but they were shifts within the European political system and did not upset that system as such.

overall, treaty resulted in peace

Congress criticized for lack of foresight

The peace settlement of Vienna has more often been condemned than praised. The accusation most frequently levelled against the Congress of Vienna has been that it lacked foresight in appraising the forces of modern nationalism and liberalism. Foresight is, indeed, one of the main qualities that distinguishes the statesman from the mere political professional. But even a statesman can only build with the bricks at hand and cannot hope to construct the second floor before he had modelled the first by which to shelter his own generation. His foresight of future developments can often express itself only by cautious attempts at keeping the way open for an evolution of the new forces.

not a reactionary peace

It is questionable how successful the Congress of Vienna was in this respect. None of the Congress representatives was a statesman or political thinker of the first historic rank. All of them were strong partisans of conservatism or outright reaction, and they found the rectitude of their convictions confirmed by the victory of the old powers over the revolutionary usurper. Still, they did not make a reactionary peace. They recognized that France could not live without a constitutional charter, and they knew, too, that the Holy Roman Empire was beyond resurrection. The new German Confederation represented a great improvement of the political conditions of Germany if one remembers that in Germany as well as in Italy the national movements were not strong enough to serve as pillars of a new order. In eastern Europe, furthermore, the modern ideas of nationality had hardly found more than a small academic and literary audience. A peace treaty cannot create new historical forces; it can only place the existing ones in a relationship most conducive to the maintenance of mutual confidence and least likely to lead to future conflict. The rest must be left to the ever continuing and never finished daily work of the statesmen.

In this light the Vienna settlement was a constructive peace treaty.

A detailed, intellectual analysis of the post-Napoleonic Nation-State system. BOP.

By Henry Kissinger

Early in the nineteenth century, Great Britain turned its *ad hoc* defense of the balance of power into a conscious design. Until then, it had gone about its policy pragmatically, consistent with the genius of the British people, resisting any country threatening the equilibrium—which, in the eighteenth century, was invariably France. Wars ended with compromise, usually marginally enhancing the position of France but depriving it of the hegemony which was its real goal.

Inevitably, France provided the occasion for the first detailed statement of what Great Britain understood by the balance of power. Having sought pre-eminence for a century and a half in the name of *raison d'état*, France after the Revolution had returned to earlier concepts of universality. No longer did France invoke *raison d'état* for its expansionism, even less the glory of its fallen kings. After the Revolution, France made war on the rest of Europe to preserve its revolution and to spread republican ideals throughout Europe. Once again, a preponderant France was threatening to dominate Europe. Conscript armies and ideological fervor propelled French armies across Europe on behalf of universal principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Under Napoleon, they came within a hairsbreadth of establishing a European commonwealth centered on France. By 1807, French armies had set up satellite kingdoms along the Rhine in Italy and Spain, reduced Prussia to a second-rank power, and gravely weakened Austria. Only Russia stood between Napoleon and France's domination of Europe.

Yet Russia already inspired the ambivalent reaction—part hope and part fear—that was to be its lot until the present day. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Russian frontier had been on the Dnieper; a century later, it reached the Vistula, 500 miles farther west. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Russia had been fighting for its existence

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against Sweden at Poltava, deep in present-day Ukraine. By the middle of the century, it was participating in the Seven Years' War, and its troops were at Berlin. By the end of the century, it would be the principal agent in the partition of Poland.

Russia's raw physical power was made all the more ominous by the merciless autocracy of its domestic institutions. Its absolutism was not mitigated by custom or by an assertive and independent aristocracy, as was the case with the monarchs ruling by divine right in Western Europe. In Russia, everything depended on the whim of the tsar. It was entirely possible for Russian foreign policy to veer from liberalism to conservatism depending on the mood of the incumbent tsar—as indeed it did under the reigning Tsar Alexander I. At home, however, no liberal experiment was ever attempted.

In 1804, the mercurial Alexander I, Tsar of all the Russias, approached British Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger, Napoleon's most implacable enemy, with a proposition. Heavily influenced by the philosophers of the Enlightenment, Alexander I imagined himself as the moral conscience of Europe and was in the last phase of his temporary infatuation with liberal institutions. In that frame of mind, he proposed to Pitt a vague scheme for universal peace, calling for all nations to reform their constitutions with a view to ending feudalism and adopting constitutional rule. The reformed states would thereupon abjure force and submit their disputes with one another to arbitration. The Russian autocrat thus became the unlikely precursor of the Wilsonian idea that liberal institutions were the prerequisite to peace, though he never went so far as to seek to translate these principles into practice among his own people. And within a few years, he would move to the opposite conservative extreme of the political spectrum.

Pitt now found himself in much the same position vis-à-vis Alexander as Churchill would find himself vis-à-vis Stalin nearly 150 years later. He desperately needed Russian support against Napoleon, for it was impossible to imagine how Napoleon could be defeated in any other way. On the other hand, Pitt had no more interest than Churchill would later have in replacing one dominant country with another, or in endorsing Russia as the arbiter of Europe. Above all, British domestic inhibitions did not allow any prime minister to commit his country to basing peace on the political and social reform of Europe. No British war had ever been fought for such a cause, because the British people did not feel threatened by social and political upheavals on the Continent, only by changes in the balance of power.

Pitt's reply to Alexander I captured all of these elements. Ignoring the

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Russian's call for the political reform of Europe, he outlined the equilibrium that would need to be constructed if peace was to be preserved. A general European settlement was now being envisaged for the first time since the Peace of Westphalia a century and a half before. And, for the first time ever, a settlement would be explicitly based on the principles of the balance of power.

Pitt saw the principal cause for instability in the weakness of Central Europe, which had repeatedly tempted French incursion and attempts at predominance. (He was too polite and too eager for Russian help to point out that a Central Europe strong enough to withstand French pressures would be equally in a position to thwart Russian expansionist temptations.) A European settlement needed to begin by depriving France of all her postrevolutionary conquests and, in the process, restore the independence of the Low Countries, thereby nearly making the chief British concern a principle of settlement.²²

Reducing French preponderance would be of no use, however, if the 300-odd smaller German states continued to tempt French pressure and intervention. To thwart such ambitions, Pitt thought it necessary to create "great masses" in the center of Europe by consolidating the German principalities into larger groupings. Some of the states which had joined France or collapsed ignominiously would be annexed by Prussia or Austria. Others would be formed into larger units.

Pitt avoided any reference to a European government. Instead, he proposed that Great Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia guarantee the new territorial arrangement in Europe by means of a permanent alliance directed against French aggression—just as Franklin D. Roosevelt later tried to base the post-World War II international order on an alliance against Germany and Japan. Neither Great Britain in the Napoleonic period nor America in World War II could imagine that the biggest threat to peace in the future might prove to be the current ally rather than the yet-to-be-defeated enemy. It was a measure of the fear of Napoleon that a British prime minister should have been willing to agree to what heretofore had been so adamantly rejected by his country—a permanent engagement on the Continent—and that Great Britain should impair its tactical flexibility by basing its policy on the assumption of a permanent enemy.

The emergence of the European balance of power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries parallels certain aspects of the post-Cold War world. Then, as now, a collapsing world order spawned a multitude of states pursuing their national interests, unrestrained by any overriding principles. Then, as now, the states making up the international order were groping for some definition of their international role. Then the

various states decided to rely entirely on asserting their national interest, putting their trust in the so-called unseen hand. The issue is whether the post-Cold War world can find some principle to restrain the assertion of power and self-interest. Of course, in the end a balance of power always comes about *de facto* when several states interact. The question is whether the maintenance of the international system can turn into a conscious design, or whether it will grow out of a series of tests of strength.

By the time the Napoleonic Wars were ending, Europe was ready to design—for the only time in its history—an international order based on the principles of the balance of power. It had been learned in the crucible of the wars of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that the balance of power could not be left to the residue of the collision of the European states. Pitt's plan had outlined a territorial settlement to rectify the weaknesses of the eighteenth-century world order. But Pitt's Continental allies had learned an additional lesson.

Power is too difficult to assess, and the willingness to vindicate it too various, to permit treating it as a reliable guide to international order. Equilibrium works best if it is buttressed by an agreement on common values. The balance of power inhibits the *capacity* to overthrow the international order; agreement on shared values inhibits the *desire* to overthrow the international order. Power without legitimacy tempts tests of strength; legitimacy without power tempts empty posturing.

Combining both elements was the challenge and the success of the Congress of Vienna, which established a century of international order uninterrupted by a general war.

Self-Help: Middle-Class Attitudes

Samuel Smiles

Middle-class liberals were not totally unaware of the consequences of industrialization for society. Doctrines were developed that reflected and appealed to their attitudes. Such doctrines served to justify the position of the middle class, to support policies it usually favored, and to rationalize the poor state of the working class. Many of these doctrines appeared in Self-Help, the popular book by Samuel Smiles, a physician, editor, secretary of two railroads, and author. First published in 1859, Self-Help became a best seller in England and was translated into many languages. The following excerpt is a good example of the individualism and moral tone that appear throughout the book.

Consider: How Smiles justifies his assertion that self-help is the only answer to problems; how Smiles would analyze the situation of the working class and how he would react to the testimony presented to the parliamentary commission on child labor.

Very conservative

"Heaven helps those who help themselves" is a well-tried maxim, embodying in a small compass the results of vast human experience. The spirit of self-help is the root of all genuine growth in the individual; and, exhibited in the lives of many, it constitutes the true source of national vigor and strength. Help from without is often enfeebling in its effects, but help from within invariably invigorates. Whatever is done for men or classes, to a certain extent takes away the stimulus and necessity of doing for themselves; and where men are subjected to over-guidance and over-government, the inevitable tendency is to render them comparatively helpless.

Even the best institutions can give a man no active help. Perhaps the most they can do is, to leave him free to develop himself and improve his individual condition. But in all times men have been prone to believe that their happiness and well-being were to be secured by means of institutions rather than by their own conduct. Hence the value of legislation as an agent in human advancement has usually been much over-estimated. To constitute the milllonth part of a Legislature, by voting for one or two men once in three or five years, however conscientiously this duty may be performed, can exercise but little active influence upon any man's life and character. Moreover, it is every day becoming more clearly understood, that the function of Government is negative and restrictive, rather than positive and active; being resolvable principally into protection—protection of life, liberty, and property. Laws, wisely administered, will secure men in the enjoyment of the fruits of their labor, whether of mind or body, at a com-

Source: Samuel Smiles, Self-Help (Chicago: Belford, Clarke, 1881), pp. 21-22, 48-49.

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paratively small personal sacrifice; but no laws, however stringent, can make the idle industrious, the shiftless provident, or the drunken sober. Such reforms can only be effected by means of individual action, economy, and self-denial: by better habits, rather than by greater rights. . . .

Indeed, all experience serves to prove that the worth and strength of a State depend far less upon the form of its institutions than upon the character of its men. For the nation is only an aggregate of individual conditions, and civilization itself is but a question of the personal improvement of the men, women, and children of whom society is composed.

National progress is the sum of individual industry, energy, and uprightiness, as national decay is of individual idleness, selfishness, and vice. What we are accustomed to decay as great social evils, will for the most part be found to be but the outgrowth of man's own perverted life; and though we may endeavor to cut them down and extirpate them by means of Law, they will only spring up again with fresh luxuriance in some other form, unless the conditions of personal life and character are radically improved. If this view be correct, then it follows that the highest patriotism and philanthropy consist, not so much in altering laws and modifying institutions, as in helping and stimulating men to elevate and improve themselves by their own free and independent individual action.

One of the most strongly marked features of the English people is their spirit of industry, standing out prominent and distinct in their past history, and as strikingly characteristic of them now as at any former period. It is this spirit, displayed by the commons of England, which has laid the foundations and built up the industrial greatness of the empire. This vigorous growth of the nation has been mainly the result of the free energy of individuals, and it has been contingent upon the number of hands and minds from time to time actively employed within it, whether as cultivators of the soil, producers of articles of utility, contrivers of tools and machines, writers of books, or creators of works of art. And while this spirit of active industry has been the vital principle of the nation, it has also been its saving and remedial one, counteracting from time to time the effects of errors in our laws and imperfections in our constitution.

The career of industry which the nation has pursued, has also proved its best education. As steady application to work is the healthiest training for every individual, so is it the best discipline of a state. Honorable industry travels the same road with duty; and Providence has closely linked both with happiness. The gods, says the poet, have placed labor and toil on the way leading to the Elysian fields. Certain it is that no bread eaten by man is so sweet as that earned by his own labor, whether bodily or mental. By labor the earth has been subdued, and man redeemed from barbarism; nor has a single step in civilization been made without it. Labor is not only a necessity and a duty, but a blessing: only the idler feels it to be a curse. The duty of work is written on the thews and muscles of the limbs, the mechanism of the hand, the nerves and lobes of the brain—the sum of whose healthy action is satisfaction and enjoyment. In the school of labor is taught the best practical wisdom: nor is a life of manual employment, as we shall hereafter find, incompatible with high mental culture.

The Triumph of the Middle Classes: 1848

Charles Morazé

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The revolutions of 1848 have been at the center of historical debate for a long time. To some, 1848 represents the end of the system set up by the Congress of Vienna; to others it represents the great battle between the forces of liberalism and conservatism; and to still others, it represents the point at which liberalism, nationalism, socialism, and Romanticism met. Perhaps the most persistent historiographical tradition views 1848 as a point at which history made a "wrong" turn. Some aspects of this historical debate are reflected in the following interpretation of 1848 by the French historian Charles Morazé. Here Morazé views the revolutions from a socioeconomic perspective, emphasizing the revolutions of 1848 as a great victory for middle-class capitalism.

Consider: According to Morazé, the economic factors that helped cause and end the revolutions of 1848; how Morazé supports his conclusion that this was a victory for middle-class capitalism; in what ways the aristocracy and working classes "lost."

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Thus the revolts of 1848 were an explosion of liberal nationalism which failed, although their effect was to shake the feudal structure so thoroughly that it gave place to a capitalist and bourgeois law, supporting individual ownership, based on a code like that of France. The year 1848 saw the last ineffectual flicker of Romanticism and the first great victory for capitalism.

Eastern Europe then became middle class and shed its tenacious traditions, its feudalism, castes, trade guilds and time-honoured ways of life. It entered the age of codified law, which was kept well up to date by great elected assemblies, and guaranteed the owner his land and the industrialist his credit. In Frankfurt, Rome or Paris there had been little mention of railways, but it was they which had broken up the rigid framework of credit based on personal estate; and by their demands a new monetary and financial world was created, enabling the railways to expand into new areas. The agricultural crisis activated a revolution in the urban industrial economy. Order was re-established in Europe as in England, for gold from the New World no longer enriched either an antiquated feudalism or a radical socialism, but rather strengthened the financial economy imposed by the railways, which gave its shape to capitalism.

? The 1848 revolution saw the definitive failure of socialism. French theorists who had severely criticized the middle-class indifference to poverty as being barely concealed under an affectation of charitable virtue, could not seize power in spite of the vehement eloquence of Proudhon, who dominated the debates in the republican assemblies; they could not even prevent the disastrous failure of the national workshops which were a caricature of the dreams of the first socialist age. Outside France, English chartism collapsed in ridicule, for the worker across the Channel was definitely no revolutionary. In Germany, Marx and his friends had tried to take advantage of the revolutionary movement to win support for their own brand of socialism. After having launched their celebrated manifesto in Paris, they had gone back to Cologne to replace the too liberal *Kölnische Zeitung*, on which Marx had been a collaborator some years earlier, by the *Neue Kölnische Zeitung*. But Marx was expelled in 1849. The crisis of 1846-8 deprived English landlords of the precious Corn Laws and the feudal lords of eastern Germany of the gangs of serf labour and Austria of serfdom itself. Middle-class capitalism was the great victor. From 1850 onwards it was to flourish with extraordinary vigour with the new supplies of American and Australian gold.

The First Chartist Petition: Demands for Change in England

Movements for reform occurred throughout Europe between 1815 and 1848 despite the efforts of conservatives to quash them. Eventually almost all countries in Europe experienced the revolutions conservatives feared so much. One exception was England, but even there political movements threatened to turn into violent revolts against the failure of the government to change. The most important of these was the Chartist movement, made up primarily of members of the working class who wanted reforms for themselves. The following is an excerpt from the first charter presented to the House of Commons in 1838. Subsequent charters were presented in 1842 and 1848. In each case the potential existed for a mass movement to turn into a violent revolt, and in each case Parliament rejected the Chartist demands. Only later in the century were most of these demands met.

potential
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violence

{ Consider: The nature of the Chartists' demands; by what means the Chartists hoped to achieve their ends; how Metternich might analyze these demands.

demand
suffrage

Required, as we are universally, to support and obey the laws, nature and reason entitle us to demand that in the making of the laws the universal voice shall be implicitly listened to. We perform the duties of freemen; we must have the privileges of freemen. Therefore, we demand universal suffrage. The suffrage, to be exempt from the corruption of the wealthy and the violence of the powerful, must be secret. The assertion of our right necessarily involves the power of our uncontrolled exercise. We ask for the reality of a good, not for its semblance, therefore we demand the ballot.

The connection between the representatives and the people, to be beneficial, must be intimate. The legislative and constituent powers, for correction and for instruction, ought to be brought into frequent contact. Errors which are comparatively light, when susceptible of a speedy popular remedy, may produce the most disastrous effects when permitted to grow inveterate through years of compulsory endurance. To public safety, as well as public confidence, frequent elections are essential. Therefore, we demand annual parliaments. With power to choose, and freedom in choosing, the range of our choice must be unrestricted. We are compelled, by the existing laws, to take for our representatives men who are incapable of appreciating our difficulties, or have little sympathy with them; merchants who have retired from trade and no longer feel its harrassings; proprietors of land who are alike ignorant of its evils and its cure; lawyers by whom the notoriety of the senate is courted only as a means of obtaining notice in the courts. The labours of a representative who is sedulous in the discharge of his duty are numerous and burdensome. It is neither just, nor reasonable, nor safe, that they should continue to be gratuitously rendered. We demand that in the future election of members of your honourable house, the approbation of the constituency shall be the sole qualification, and that to every representative so chosen, shall be assigned out of the public taxes, a fair and adequate remuneration for the time which he is called upon to devote to the public service. The management of his mighty kingdom has hitherto been a subject for contending factions to try their selfish experiments upon. We have felt the consequences in our sorrowful experience. Short glimmerings of uncertain enjoyment, swallowed up by long and dark seasons of suffering. If the self-government of the people should not remove their distresses, it will, at least, remove their repinings. Universal suffrage will, and it alone can, bring true and lasting peace to the nation; we firmly believe that it will also bring prosperity. May it therefore please your honourable house, to take this our petition into your most serious consideration, and to use your utmost endeavours, by all constitutional means, to have a law passed, granting to every male of lawful age, sane mind, and unconvicted of crime, the right of voting for members of parliament, and directing all future elections of members of parliament to be in the way of secret ballot, and ordaining that the duration of parliament, so chosen, shall in no case exceed one year, and abolishing all property qualifications in the members, and providing for their due remuneration while in attendance on their parliamentary duties.

"And your petitioners shall ever pray."